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EU: Fine in airline cartel and parent liability considerations

#antitrust #ABASAL

The note below was posted on the listserve of the International Committee of the Section of Antitrust Law, American Bar Association, and is an example of the timely reports provided to members.

I. Today, the European Commission (Commission) fined 11 airlines a total

of EUR 799,5 million for fixing prices in their cargo business. These

carriers coordinated their action on surcharges for fuel and security

without discounts over a six year period. The cartel arrangements

consisted of numerous contacts between airlines, at both bilateral and

multilateral level, covering flights from, to and within the EEA. Airlines

providing airfreight services primarily offer the transport of cargo to

freight forwarders, who arrange the carriage of these goods including

associated services and formalities on behalf of shippers.

At the same time, the Commission allegations of collusion on two other

surcharges and regarding freight rates in the Statement of Objections have

been dropped from the case for insufficient evidence. The Commission also

dropped charges against another 11 carriers and one consultancy firm which

had previously received the Statement of Objections for the same reason.

All carriers were granted a 50% reduction on sales between the EEA and

third countries in order to take into account the fact that on these

routes part of the harm of the cartel fell outside the EEA. The Commission

increased the fine for SAS by 50% for its previous involvement in a cartel

in the airline sector. All carriers received a reduction of 15% on account

of the general regulatory environment in the sector which can be seen as

encouraging price coordination. Four carriers were also granted a 10%

reduction for limited participation in the infringement. As the fines on

two companies would have exceeded the legal maximum of 10% of their 2009

turnover, the amount (before possible leniency considerations) was reduced

to this level.

Five carriers applied for a reduction claiming inability to pay the fine.

However, none of the applications met the conditions for a reduction.

II. A couple of weeks ago, there were a few interesting decisions/opinions

regarding parent liability for cartels. The General Court held in T-24/05,

Alliance One and Others vs. Commission (i) that liability cannot be

imposed on a parent company that has pure financial interests (see para

195 seq). In this respect see also para 67 of the Opinion of the General

Advocat Kokott dated ? 23.4.2009 in C-97/08? P, Akzo Nobel NV ua vs

Commission, decision by the ECJ dated 14 September 2010.? (ii) Regarding

Joint Ventures the Court held that where an undertaking is under the joint

control of two or more other undertakings or persons, those undertakings

or persons are by definition able to exercise decisive influence over it.

That is not enough, however, to enable them to be held liable for the

infringement of the competition rules committed by the undertaking which

they control jointly, because such liability also requires fulfillment of

the condition concerning the actual exercise of decisive influence. If

those conditions are fulfilled, it would be possible to hold the various

undertakings or persons which exercise joint control liable for the

unlawful conduct of their subsidiary, as the judgment in Case T-314/01

Avebe v Commission [2006] ECR II-3085 illustrates. In that case, the

General Court upheld a Commission decision attributing to two companies,

each with a 50% shareholding in a subsidiary and having joint management

power in the commercial management of the subsidiary, liability for the

unlawful conduct of that subsidiary. If it transpired that, in reality,

only one of the undertakings or persons holding joint control in fact

exercises decisive influence over the conduct of their subsidiary, or if

other specific circumstances were to justify it, the Commission would be

able to hold only that undertaking or person jointly and severally liable,

with its subsidiary, for the infringement committed by the subsidiary.

III. Regarding a linked subject matter, Advocate General Yves Bot stated

on 26 October 2010 in C-352/09 P, ThyssenKrupp vs Commission, that

competition law is for everyone mandatory law, the application of which

cannot be excluded by contractual agreements. Hence, an agreement between

two parties declaring that the application of competition rules should be

differ from the common rules should be void regarding the liability

towards the Commission.

For additional information please find

1. Commission Press release at

http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/10/1487&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.

 

2.Judgment of the General Court T-24/05 Alliance One vs

Commission dated ? 27 October 2010, ? at

http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/gettext.pl?lang=en&num=79898972T19050024&doc=T&ouvert=T&seance=ARRET

3.Opinion of the Advocate General in C-352/09 P, ThyssenKrupp vs

Commission dated 26 October 2010 at

http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=en&jurcdj=jurcdj&newform=newform&docj=docj&docop=docop&docnoj=docnoj&typeord=ALLTYP&numaff=&ddatefs=20&mdatefs=10&ydatefs=2010&ddatefe=27&mdatefe=10&ydatefe=2010&nomusuel=&domaine=&mots=&resmax=100&S

ubmit=Rechercher (no English version available).

Kind regards,

______________________________________

Christina Hummer

Dr. iur., LL.M. (NYU)

Solicitor (England & Wales) / Attorney-at-Law (New York)

Saxinger Chalupsky & Partner

Rechtsanwälte GmbH

B-1040 Brussels, Rue de Pascale 22

Tel +32 2 230 78 00

Fax +32 2 230 78 10

01:06 pm, by abasal1 note

Notes
  1. craigbachman reblogged this from abasal
  2. abasal posted this